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Attorney General 
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P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 




ZACHERY SCOTT SHIPMAN, 
 












          NO. 43632 
 
          Kootenai County Case No.  
          CR-2014-1461 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 




Shipman Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Shipman pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under 16 and, on October 1, 
2014, the district court imposed a unified sentence of 20 years, with 10 years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.86-89.)  In May 2015, Shipman returned from the rider 
program with a recommendation for relinquishment; however, the district court 
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continued to retain jurisdiction and entered an order requesting that Shipman be 
returned to the rider program.  (R., pp.104-05; PSI, p.61.1)  In September 2015, 
following a jurisdictional review hearing, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and 
reduced Shipman’s sentence to a unified sentence of 20 years, with five years fixed.  
(R., pp.109-10.)  Shipman filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order 
relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.111-14.)  He also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a 
reduction of sentence, which the district court granted, reducing the Shipman’s 
sentence to a unified sentence of 20 years, with four years fixed.  (R., pp.120-21; Order 
Granting Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to I.C.R. 35 
(Augmentation).)     
Shipman asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction because he disputes rider staff’s characterization of his behavior toward 
other offenders as “grooming behavior,” because he believes that the district court relied 
only on his static risk factors in determining that there was no change to his risk level, 
and because his “poor journaling” while in the rider program “did not warrant 
relinquishment.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-10.)  Shipman has failed to establish an abuse 
of discretion.   
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.”  I.C. § 19-2601(4). 
 The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.  See  
 
                                            
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “CR14-




State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 
205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court’s decision to relinquish 
jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient 
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be 
inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 
584 (Ct. App. 1984).   
 Shipman first contends that it was improper for the district court to relinquish 
jurisdiction based in part on what the rider staff characterized as “grooming behavior.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.)  While the district court stated it did not “take any offense” to 
the use of the word “grooming” (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.6-7), it clearly did not base its 
decision on a belief that Shipman was, as he defines the word, “preparing … children 
for sexual abuse” (Appellant’s brief, p.6) during his rider.  Rather, the court indicated 
that it did not take issue with the word “grooming” because it was “used in the [APSI], 
it’s a word attributed to [Shipman] in the report.”  (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.6-9.)   
Furthermore, regardless of whether or not rider staff was correctly using the word 
“grooming” to describe Shipman’s inappropriate behavior, the fact remains that 
Shipman’s behavior clearly violated program rules and did, in fact, indicate “poor 
boundaries and instant gratification,” which reduced the likelihood that he could be 
safely supervised in the community.  (PSI, p.89.)  Shipman first violated NICI’s “touching 
policy” by “getting close behind another offender and resting his chin on the other 
offender’s shoulder.”  (PSI, pp.75-76.)  He received a warning about this behavior; 
however, he continued to engage in inappropriate conduct toward other offenders.  
Rider staff reported a “minimum of four occasions” during which Shipman “approached 
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these young men with sexual innuendo and desire” and noted that the other offenders 
were all “younger looking and somewhat passive males.”  (R., pp.64, 75-76.)  Four 
months into his rider, an offender reported: “‘[Shipman] told me I was his type of guy ….  
He mentioned if we get out maybe having sex with me, and I said you have a [girlfriend], 
and he said she didn’t have to know.’”  (PSI, p.73.)  Shipman later admitted to rider staff 
that “if [he and the other offender] did get together in the community, he would likely 
pursue a sexual relationship with [the other offender].”  (PSI, p.73.)  Shipman received a 
DOR as a result of this incident, as staff advised, “This behavior is considered sexual 
harassment within this prison setting.”  (PSI, pp.63, 67.)  NICI subsequently 
recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction, stating that Shipman’s 
behavior “indicat[ed] his lack of control and/or ability to modify his behavior in the most 
controlled environment available.  He does not appear to be amenable to probationary 
supervision at this time.”  (PSI, pp.61, 70.)   
At the jurisdictional review hearing held on May 21, 2015, the district court 
continued to retain jurisdiction, but warned: 
 Well, if I had to make my decision today it would be to follow the 
report recommendation; that’s that I relinquish jurisdiction.  I have nothing 
to lose by sending you back on your rider.  The department doesn’t have 
to take you back.  If they don’t, then I’ll relinquish jurisdiction.  There are 
parts of this report that say you’re amenable to treatment, but what I think 
the report is saying is that you’re not an acceptable risk to be put in the 
public and treated in the public, and I completely agree with that 
assessment, and even – I don’t want you the get your hopes up, because 
even if you come back with a recommendation for probation, I can’t make 
this go away.  I will not put it out of my mind.  I will not put the facts of your 
underlying crime out of my mind, but there is no way I will place you on 
probation five months from now or however many more months you have 
left if there is any more conduct.   
 
 You know, I don’t give a darn about your sexuality, but what I will 
not tolerate is you not being able to control your impulses, and this report 
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is chock-full with that, so if there is any indication that you can’t control 
your impulses sexually, you’re going to go to prison, I won’t modify your 
sentence … so either figure out a way to get control of your impulses or 
get used to being in an institutional setting because I won’t accept an 
unreasonable risk to have you out in the community, and that’s all I see 
here right now.   
 
(5/21/15 Tr., p.31, L.24 – p.33, L.4 (emphasis added).)   
 Less than three weeks after he was returned to the rider program at NICI, 
Shipman resumed his inappropriate behavior and incurred a disciplinary sanction.  (PSI, 
p.79.)  The report of the incident stated: 
 Mr. Shipman was seen by staff walking the ball field with an 
offender he had previously engaged in grooming behavior with.  Mr. 
Shipman was given a direct order to stay away from that offender.  When 
confronted in group about his behavior, he attempted to minimize his 
behavior.  However, he eventually admitted that he in fact is attracted to 
the other offender and was engaging in grooming behavior.  As he was 
told during his previous “Rider,” if he continues with such behavior, he will 
not be safe in the community, as it indicates poor boundaries and instant 
gratification.   
 
(PSI, p.79.)  In the subsequent APSI, program staff reported that Shipman “did the bare 
minimum in his assigned work of the required program material,” including providing 
“the bare minimum of detail” in his Fearless Criminal Inventory and doing a “poor job of 
journaling daily, completing approximately 30% of the entries.”  (PSI, pp.80, 82.)  At the 
second jurisdictional review hearing, the district court noted that Shipman had again 
engaged in conduct that he admitted was grooming behavior, and stated: 
So that event, the fact that you did a poor job of journaling daily, 
and you completed only about thirty percent of your entries gives me no 
confidence that you would be able to turn it around in the community, and 
… this is a protection of the public matter.  What you did with your victim in 






 So you can phrase it however you want to, and that’s great, I’m 
glad that you’ve learned something in the programming that you’ve been 
through in almost your last 365 days, but I am not convinced that we’re 
anywhere close to the point where I could in good conscience – 
consciousness release you out into the community for further sex offender 
treatment. 
 
(9/24/15 Tr., p.52, L.23 – p.54, L.1.)   
The district court clearly did not base its decision to relinquish jurisdiction on a 
mistaken belief that Shipman was preparing children for sexual abuse during his rider.  
Instead, it considered Shipman’s lack of impulse control and ongoing violations of the 
Sex Offender Assessment Group rules -- even after the court specifically warned him to 
cease such behavior if he did not wish to remain incarcerated, the fact that Shipman put 
minimal effort into his programming, and the fact that Shipman’s assessed risk level had 
not been reduced.  While it is true that the district court stated, “The STATIC-99 has 
gone nowhere; still at a moderate to high risk to reoffend” (9/24/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.5-6), the 
court subsequently clarified that it understood that the static factors would not change, 
but that Shipman’s overall risk level had not been reduced (9/24/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.7-20; 
compare PSI, p.43 with PSI, p.85).  Specifically, in response to defense counsel 
pointing out that Shipman’s static risk factors would not change over time, the district 
court stated: 
I understand that, but we’re still at an assessed moderate to high 
level with conduct occurring in a controlled setting, the grooming behavior, 
and going back after our meeting in May of this year and still continuing in 
that behavior there – I understand your point, but that moderate to high 
level is too much of a risk, and I think the moderate to high level of risk is 
corroborated by his engaging in further conduct in a sexual nature in a 
prison setting, and … I don’t see that fact changing that there won’t be a 
high likelihood of future victims, and I think it corroborates the moderate to 
high level that we’ve seen in this case if that makes sense.   
 
(9/24/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.7-20.)   
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 The district court considered all of the relevant information and reasonably 
concluded that Shipman was not an appropriate candidate for probation, particularly in 
light of the egregiousness of the offense, Shipman’s poor conduct and minimal effort in 
the rider program, and the risk he presents to the community.  Given any reasonable 
view of the facts, Shipman has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.   
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
relinquishing jurisdiction. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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